Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s logico-epistemological tradition profoundly shaped Tibetan scholasticism. Examining two prominent figures, rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and ‘Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912), this study reveals how they appropriated and interpreted three of Dharmakīrti’s key concepts, found in his Pramāṇavāttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya. It compares these Tibetan commentators’ renderings of Dharmakīrti’s rationale in proving three fundamental Buddhist assertions: that the basic nature of the mind is luminous in that it is ultimately untarnished; that the path to liberation constitutes a gradual cultivation of analytical enquiry to generate authoritative epistemic instruments (pramāṇa); and that the ultimate result of such a path has no limited endpoint as qualities like love, and gnosis can be developed infinitely.
Through such comparative analysis this paper argues that despite these two Tibetan authors disagreeing about the nature of emptiness, their soteriological templates through which such a truth is ultimately understood are surprisingly similar. It also seeks to illustrate that despite living nearly 500 years apart, the incredible uniformity that can be seen in their interpretations highlights the enormous authority Dharmakīrti had in Tibet, an authority that both Tibetan authors sought to utilise and be harmonious with.