The theory of language that underlies Plotinus’ Enneads is considered in relation to his
broader metaphysical vision. For Plotinus, language is neither univocal nor equivocal,
but is something in-between, incapable of precisely describing reality, but nonetheless
not completely useless. Propositional knowledge expressed discursively represents an
imperfect shadow of reality which is defective in relation to the pure apprehension of
Intellect. Passages in Plotinus which relate language to the sensible world are examined
and it is argued that, although it plays a useful role in relating the sensible world
to Intellect, discursive reason is nonetheless intrinsically inferior to both as a mode of
representation. Plotinus holds that the inadequacy of language is “global” in character;
language cannot describe any aspect of reality precisely, from the mundane to the
transcendent. Language as a whole is an inferior image or imitation of the world as a
whole. Therefore, the flaws in our linguistic representations cannot all be untangled
or conceptually unpacked by means of language. There are passages in the Enneads
which hint at an underlying semantic holism. Plotinus’ theory implies that apparent
verbal contradictions which occur in different contexts might nonetheless still represent
the optimal linguistic description of a reality that strictly speaking is ineffable.
Therefore, discursive logical deduction is not always reliable, and needs to be subordinated
to a vision of Intellect. True philosophical reasoning (dialectic) represents ostension
towards the transcendent. Those who are sufficiently liberated to attain to an
apprehension of the Forms, thereby come to inhabit the same “higher world”, involving
a shared mystical intersubjectivity, which can be expressed linguistically, but only in
an approximate manner. Plotinus’ theory presents a potential way out of the nihilistic
impasse into which contemporary philosophy has arguably become enmeshed.